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The UK government’s new Industrial Strategy could have a significant impact on the 
country’s regions and localities. However, this has received little attention to date. The ana-
lysis presented here examines the existing location of the sectors targeted by the first phase 
of the Industrial Strategy Challenge Fund and the location of the R&D laboratories likely 
to be first in line for funding. In focusing on an extremely narrow range of sectors, the Fund 
is likely to have limited impact on the UK’s persistent regional inequalities. The activities 
eligible for support account for relatively little of manufacturing or the rest of the economy 
and the basis of this targeting and its potential distributional consequences are spatially 
blind. As such, it runs the risk of widening regional divides in prosperity.
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Introduction
In line with many advanced industrial na-
tions in responding to the challenges posed by 
“radical and disruptive technologies” (Bailey 
et al., 2019, 4), the UK government is currently 
pursuing a new direction in terms of its indus-
trial strategy. This is also in part an overdue re-
sponse to the recession that followed the 2008 
financial crisis, which exposed the UK’s reli-
ance on financial and business services. It also 
aims to address the UK’s relatively low level of 
productivity, seen as a significant contributing 
factor to the country’s sluggish GDP growth 
(Haldane, 2017). In broader historical terms, it 
also represents an attempt to revive and mod-
ernise domestic manufacturing industry to try 
and take advantage of what is being heralded 
as the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’, “a fusion 
of technologies across the physical, digital, and 
biological spheres” (Schwab, 2017, 7). However, 
for the UK, this will require sustained efforts to 
overcome a long-term “chronic failure to invest 
in manufacturing” (Kitson and Michie, 2014, 1).
Indeed, over successive decades, the UK’s in-
dustrial output has stagnated and its industrial 
employment has fallen, and to a far greater ex-
tent than in most other industrialised nations 
(Kitson and Michie, 2014; McCann, 2016). 
Thus, between 1973 and 2007, comparator na-
tions such as France, Germany, Japan and the 
USA all had average annual growth rates for 
manufacturing output of above 2%, whereas 
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the UK’s was 0.4% (Kitson and Michie, 2014, 
14). The decline in industrial employment has 
been equally stark, in the UK falling by over 
40% over the same period, whereas similar na-
tions mostly experienced falls at less than half 
that rate (Kitson and Michie, 2014, 15). One 
consequence has been a vast trade deficit with 
the rest of the world, forcing the UK economy 
to become increasingly reliant on a debt-fuelled 
model of growth (Gamble, 2008). The contrast 
with Germany, where manufacturing’s share 
of GDP is double that in the UK and where 
there is neither a trade deficit nor a budget 
deficit, could not be starker (Roper and Love, 
2002; Vogel and Wagner, 2010). Another conse-
quence has been the stagnation of productivity 
and real wages because manufacturing, rather 
than services, tends to offer greatest scope for 
technology to bring increases in output per 
head that underpin rising national living stand-
ards (Mazzucato, 2016).
The re-emergence of industrial policy as a 
key instrument in delivering macro- and micro-
economic policy goals is reflected in support 
by the World Bank, European Commission 
and OECD as well as many leading economies 
(Barca, 2009; Hildreth and Bailey, 2014; Rodrik, 
2004). To some extent, the UK is following this 
trend. Andreoni and Chang (2016) argue that it 
is inappropriate to see contemporary industrial 
policy as having either a sectoral or a horizontal 
focus. Rather, it represents a set of approaches 
which emphasise factors such as clear and sus-
tained policy vision and commitment, the sup-
port to coordinate independent activities, the 
building of networks between economic agents 
and incentives to stimulate greater cooper-
ation between hitherto competing firms. Public 
funding is important but is not the main neces-
sary condition for industrial policies which seek 
to deliver higher levels of economic growth at 
a national level. Although contemporary in-
dustrial policy is seen by organisations such as 
the European Commission as being primarily 
a horizontal policy, as with nearly all such ap-
proaches, it will inevitably benefit some sectors 
more than others and some places more than 
others.
This issue is addressed by the European 
Commission’s Barca report (Barca, 2009) and 
its call for a place-based approach to cohesion 
policy, and explored in far more detail in Barca 
et al. (2012) and Hildreth and Bailey (2014). For 
these authors, place-based approaches meld 
traditional instruments of regional policy with 
the need to recognise and support local and re-
gional institutions, capabilities and strengths. 
To a significant extent, this approach has been 
embedded in the 2014–20 European Structural 
and Investment Funds programmes as well as 
the policy perspectives of states such as Finland 
and Germany. The place-based approach goes 
further than analyses of the World Bank (see, 
for example, Stiglitz et  al., 2013) which, while 
emphasising the national ingredients of indus-
trial policy, do not consider regional policy com-
ponents. More starkly, Faggio and Overman 
(2012) suggest that industrial policy should in 
fact be spatially blind, paying no heed to insti-
tutions, opportunities or needs at a local level.
Against this backdrop, this article explores 
the position and focus of the early phase of 
the UK’s industrial strategy in relation to this 
question of geographical disparity. We do this 
through an assessment of the likely spatial im-
plications of the first wave of the Industrial 
Strategy Challenge Fund (ISCF), and question 
whether its approach is sufficient to address 
the deep-seated regional economic imbalances 
in the UK (Martin et al., 2015). We recognise 
that the UK may represent an atypical case. 
On the one hand, it is a country which has an 
over-representation of the world’s leading re-
search, as demonstrated by successive inter-
national assessments (Elsevier, 2017). The UK 
also retains many highly innovative companies 
in both manufacturing and services. On the 
other hand, a series of spectres cast a shadow 
over the UK economy, including large regional 
variations in economic performance, a long tail 
of underperforming companies and the dispro-
portionate size of the financial services sector 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/cjres/article-abstract/12/3/445/5581956 by Sheffield H
allam
 U
niversity user on 06 January 2020
447
Industrial strategy and the UK regions
and its concentration in London. While the 
immediate and longer-term structural conse-
quences of Brexit add a further complication 
to these issues, many of the imbalances will be 
familiar in other parts of the world, for example 
in eastern Europe. In other words, there are 
likely to be lessons and pointers from the UK 
experience for other countries.
The article is structured as follows. In the 
next section, we set out the UK’s industrial 
strategy as articulated through the Green and 
White Papers, outline the focus of the first 
wave of the ISCF and provide an assessment 
of its aims and priorities against a series of cri-
teria. These provide our conceptual framework 
for understanding different variants of indus-
trial strategy. We then outline our method-
ology for our spatial analysis of the first round 
of the ISCF, but potentially for examining 
other industrial strategy instruments. The ana-
lysis of the ISCF’s initial sectoral focus is then 
presented. Finally, in the conclusion and dis-
cussion, we assess the importance of assessing 
the likely regional and spatial implications of 
industrial strategy instruments, consider how 
this analysis may be developed in the future 
and suggest some alternatives for national in-
dustrial policy.
Understanding the UK’s industrial 
strategy
The broad policy debate
Although the UK government never entirely 
abandoned its support for business and industry, 
its renewed interest in industrial policy has 
been widely welcomed, albeit not uncritically 
(Chapman and Hutton, 2017; Industrial Strategy 
Commission, 2017). This interest builds on 
earlier Coalition government policy statements 
such as the Plan for Growth (HM Treasury and 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
2011) and the subsequent White Paper Fixing 
the Foundations (HM Treasury, 2015). But the 
big change in orientation, at least in terms of 
political profile, came with the publication of a 
Green Paper and then a White Paper on indus-
trial strategy (HM Government, 2017a, 2017b). 
Part of this involves a long-term goal of raising 
the nation’s spending on research and develop-
ment (R&D) from 1.65% of GDP to 2.4% by 
2027—just above the current OECD average 
of 2.3% (HM Government, 2017a). One way of 
directly stimulating this is the funding provided 
to specific joint development projects involving 
businesses and researchers, the ISCF.
The new UK industrial strategy was launched 
at a particular juncture in UK politics. Three 
issues are worth highlighting. First, the institu-
tional framework for implementing a national 
industrial policy, at least in England, has been 
dramatically overhauled since 2010. The eight 
regional development agencies in England 
have been abolished and replaced with 38 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs)—most 
of which have far fewer resources and capacity 
to devise and implement policies (Pike et  al., 
2010). These have been joined in some areas by 
new Combined Authorities and again in some 
areas by ‘devolution deals’ between localities 
and central government (Pike et  al., 2018). 
Second, the UK has experienced a period of 
prolonged cuts to public expenditure, many 
of which have fallen hardest on the poorest 
parts of the UK (Beatty and Fothergill, 2017). 
Third, the 2016 referendum in favour of the UK 
leaving the European Union brought with it a 
decoupling from the EU’s policies and budgets 
for research and innovation on the one hand, 
and for regional cohesion on the other, and un-
certainty and lack of clarity over what, if any-
thing, might replace them in terms of support 
for industry.
These three contextual factors matter in 
understanding not just the formation of indus-
trial policy, but also its likely impact, both na-
tionally and with respect to the less prosperous 
regions of the UK. There has been a long run-
ning debate over the geography of economic 
policy, of which industrial and regional policies 
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are intrinsic parts. One view is that it should be 
‘spatially blind’ (Coombes et  al., 2005; Faggio 
and Overman, 2012), relying on market pro-
cesses to spread economic activity and pros-
perity across the country as a whole. The 
counterpoint is that it should follow a ‘place-
based’ approach (Bailey et  al., 2018; Hildreth 
and Bailey, 2013, 2014) through which govern-
ments work with local areas to develop their 
capabilities to promote economic development. 
Alternatively, the more ‘traditional’ approach 
of regional redistribution still retains support.
There has already been considerable com-
mentary on each of these issues, and most 
recently greatest attention has been on the 
potential for place-based approaches (Bailey 
et al., 2015; Berry, 2018; Fai, 2018; Jacobs et al., 
2017; Pike et  al., 2015). This interest largely 
follows the Barca report for the European 
Commission (Barca, 2009). These issues are 
given even sharper focus by the contem-
porary fulcrum of latest generation digital 
and mobile technologies. In the words of the 
previous CJRES Special Issue’s editors, “the 
increasing advance of such technologies poses 
real challenges for industrial policy and wider 
socioeconomic cohesion. With new capital in-
tensive technologies capable of displacing la-
bour, much speculation exists as to whether 
beneficiaries will reside in more dynamic re-
gions exacerbating and extenuating further 
socioeconomic and regional divides” (Bailey 
et al., 2019, 4).
As already stated, a significant focus of 
policy and political debate around the in-
dustrial strategy concerns the UK’s national 
competitiveness, its perennial problem of low 
productivity and the goal of increasing the 
UK’s expenditure on R&D to 2.4% of GDP 
by 2027. However, as well as addressing na-
tional concerns, there is acknowledgement of 
the need for the policy to reach all parts of the 
UK economy. This is demonstrated by the then 
Prime Minister (PM) Theresa May’s speech to 
a group of leading researchers and industrial-
ists in May 2018:
“And transforming the places where people 
live and work – the places where ideas and 
inspiration are born – by backing businesses 
and building infrastructure not just in London 
and the South East but across every part of our 
country.” (Emphasis added) (Theresa May, 
speech on science and modern Industrial 
Strategy, 21 May 2018, Jodrell Bank Centre 
for Astrophysics)
The UK government’s industrial strategy ap-
pears to be broadly based. In the White Paper 
published in November 2017 (HM Government, 
2017b), the government set out five ‘founda-
tions’ for creating “an economy that boosts 
productivity and earning power throughout the 
UK” (10):
 1. Ideas: the world’s most innovative economy
 2. People: good jobs and greater earning power 
for all
 3. Infrastructure: a major upgrade to the UK’s 
infrastructure
 4. Business environment: the best place to start 
and grow a business
 5. Places: prosperous communities across the 
UK
As well as the overall ethos, the second and fifth 
foundations clearly imply that the industrial 
strategy is intended to support all regions, even 
if it falls short of directly addressing regional 
inequalities. However, much of the industrial 
strategy is not backed by new funding. Indeed, 
as a UK Parliamentary Select Committee in-
quiry concluded, “while the government’s rhet-
oric marks a step change, and the creation of 
a new Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS) has significantly 
raised expectations, the government’s approach 
appears to be evolutionary” (Business, Energy 
and Industrial Strategy Committee, 2017). Their 
report also highlights shortcomings in terms of 
closely related issues such as skills, more broad 
based business support and regional assistance 
(Fothergill, 2017).
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The notable exception in terms of new 
funding is the first of the government’s five 
foundations—investing in ‘ideas’, or more pre-
cisely, innovations through science, research 
and technology. This foundation has been 
backed by substantial additional funding, 
some of it preceding the formal launch of 
the strategy. Thus, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer’s Autumn Statement in November 
2016 announced £4.7bn in additional govern-
ment funding for R&D through until 2020–21, 
a bigger increase than in any Parliament since 
1979 (HM Treasury, 2016). The Spring Budget 
in March 2017 reaffirmed this commitment 
(HM Treasury, 2017). This additional spending 
will add around 0.15 percentage points to the 
1.65% of GDP already spent on research and 
development. This is a significant step towards 
the government’s target of 2.4%, but clearly 
there will need to be a much bigger increase 
in public—and more pertinently private—
spending on R&D. Furthermore, leaving the 
European Union would significantly reduce 
the amount of EU research funding the UK re-
ceives, even if the UK remains a participant in 
any future EU research programmes.
The new R&D funding has begun to take 
a tangible form. In April 2017, the Business 
Secretary announced an initial £1bn, to be 
spent by 2020–21, for a new ISCF, intended to 
boost growth, create jobs and raise living stand-
ards by investing in cutting-edge technolo-
gies (Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, 2017). The first tranche of 
the ISCF is targeted at six activities or sectors:
 • Healthcare and medicine
 • Robotics and artificial intelligence
 • Batteries for clean and flexible energy 
storage
 • Self-driving vehicles
 • Manufacturing and materials for the future
 • Satellites and space technology
Two aspects of this list are striking. First, the 
list of sectors eligible for support is extremely 
narrow. At this stage, the government appeared 
to be placing a huge emphasis on a very small 
segment of industry. Even if the initial re-
cipients of ISCF funding trigger some wider 
benefits by working with other companies, uni-
versities and public bodies across the whole 
country, the impact is likely to be very small. 
There is mixed evidence that public funding of 
research ‘crowds-in’ rather than ‘crowds-out’ 
private R&D spending (Economic Insights 
Ltd., 2015; Marino et  al., 2016). Factors af-
fecting this include cross-national differences, 
the type of R&D support, the point in the 
business cycle, firm size and sector. However, 
as Marino et al. (2016) note, there is some evi-
dence of crowding-in over the long term. The 
implication is that the initial impact on sec-
tors and places is likely to be among the most 
important.
A second striking feature of the first wave of 
the ISCF is that the choice of activities is actu-
ally less to do with supporting specific indus-
trial sectors and more to do with technology. 
However, what is absent in the discussion are 
the models and mechanisms by which tech-
nology can have the greatest impact on in-
dustry. Evidence around innovation systems 
(Fagerberg, 2018) or specific areas such as uni-
versity–business interaction, such the role of 
triple helix models, has so far been absent from 
the debate (Audretsch et  al., 2012; Huggins 
et al., 2008).
Moreover, the six priority sectors display a 
strong emphasis on experimental and devel-
opmental research rather than on product and 
process development and the promotion of ex-
ports. In the context of limited public resources, 
the focus on this narrow range of sectors leaves 
little scope for funding developments across the 
rest of manufacturing. The assumption appears 
to be that at some future point, the technolo-
gies developed in these sectors will become 
pervasive and shape the wider economy, but 
this would seem to leave little margin for error, 
nor the prospect of widely distributed rewards 
in the short term.
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Dimensions of the industrial strategy
We argue that there are six main dimensions in 
the debate around industrial policy in general, 
and the UK’s industrial strategy in particular, 
namely spatial, technological, corporate, insti-
tutional, political and social. These dimensions 
are similar to those articulated by Jacobs et al. 
(2017), and are helpful for understanding the 
underpinning rationales for the current direc-
tion of UK industrial policy. In this instance, the 
intention is to use the framework to analyse the 
government’s approach rather than to provide 
a more normative assessment to redirect policy.
The first dimension is the spatial aspect of in-
dustrial policy. The location of economic activity 
and the economic performance of places are 
long-standing issues in regional studies (Kitson 
and Michie, 2014; Marshall, 1920), while over the 
last 20 years, there has been growing interest in 
industrial policy at the international level (for 
example, Barca, 2009), at the national scale (for 
example, Fagerberg, 2018) and at the regional 
and local level (for example, Bailey et al., 2015). 
Running through this debate has been whether 
industrial policy should be spatially blind or 
whether it should be place-based. As Bailey 
et al. (2018) note, this debate is as much to do 
with what the overall aims of economic policy 
should be: broadly, between increasing national 
economic output and international competitive 
performance on the one hand, and on the other 
with recognising the need for policy aims to be 
more nuanced,  taking into account a range of 
institutional, contextual and social measures of 
progress. The latter position lies at the heart of 
the place-based turn in economic policy (Barca 
et al., 2012; Rodrik, 2004). This is an issue ex-
plored extensively by Hildreth and Bailey 
(2013), who convincingly argue that spatially 
blind also means being blind to local historical, 
institutional and cultural factors which may 
shape economic development.
The second dimension is technological, and 
in particular is reflected in arguments that a 
‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ is underway in 
which future economic activity and indeed the 
ordering of society will be shaped by the con-
vergence of technologies in digital, materials 
science and medicine. Examples include tech-
nologies as diverse as artificial intelligence, ro-
botics, nanotechnology and genomic medicine. 
The clearest policy responses come in proposals 
such as those from the German federal govern-
ment to stimulate Industrie 4.0 (Schwab, 2017). 
Industrial policy has always worked alongside 
research policy, but the rationale of Schwab is 
that this current industrial revolution will have 
profound implications not just on the organisa-
tion of the economy but also on other spheres 
including society. However, there is some de-
bate over whether such changes will occur at 
the breakneck speed envisaged (see, for ex-
ample, Edgerton, 2006).
The third strand is a corporate one around 
the organisation of production and consump-
tion. Exponents of the ‘Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’ thesis argue that the convergence 
of technologies will reshape how economic 
activity is currently organised (Andreoni and 
Chang, 2016). In the vanguard of such changes 
have been the Internet and the way it has trans-
formed many economic transactions, as well as 
newer technologies such as machine learning 
and robotics. These have in turn been exam-
ined in terms of their potential to reshape cor-
porate strategy (Bailey et al., 2018). To a large 
extent, this is the organisational manifestation 
of technological change.
The fourth strand is at an institutional level. 
The argument here is that the ‘Fourth Industrial 
Revolution’ is underpinned by a range of new 
and reformed institutions and that these are 
tied to specific locations, anchoring an array of 
economic activities (Bailey et al., 2015; Block, 
2011). In a related vein, the mix of sectors or 
skills may allow some places to reap the advan-
tages of specialisation or agglomeration (Foray, 
2015; McCann and Ortega-Argiles, 2015; 
Rodrik, 2004). Examples include the location 
of hugely expensive research-focused capital 
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facilities, where the benefits may only be real-
ised over decades.
The fifth dimension is political, and in par-
ticular the ways in which government seeks to 
engage in markets. It also involves the role that 
technology plays in the strategic international 
positioning of nations. This is not simply about 
securing a share of international markets but 
also about controlling certain technologies for 
strategic benefits (Gamble, 2008). This issue 
is probably the one least explored in regional 
studies scholarship (see Martin, 2018 as an 
exception). From the perspective of political 
economy, this also reflects ideological positions 
in terms of the role of government in economic 
matters. Towards one extreme is libertarianism 
and Hayek’s ‘spontaneous order’ (Hayek, 1979), 
as well as the narrow use of market failure to 
support limited engagement in the provision 
of public goods. Towards the other is that of a 
more engaged role in markets reflected in both 
neo-Keynesian and place-based approaches 
(Hildreth and Bailey, 2014).
The sixth strand is social (and arguably en-
vironmental) and relates to how industrial 
strategy may support a range of non-economic 
benefits. This contains a wide range of ap-
proaches, including the need to recognise the 
foundational economy (Engelen et  al., 2017), 
to develop mechanisms that promote inclusive 
growth (Lee, 2019) and to ensure the reworking 
of existing frameworks for social and environ-
mental goals (see, for example, Rodrik, 2014 on 
a green industrial policy).
Assessing the UK’s approach
These six dimensions can help us to understand 
the shape that UK industrial policy is taking. In 
terms of the explicit rhetoric within the Green 
and White Papers, there is a strong emphasis 
on the technological rationale, which perhaps 
can be supported by a more implicit political 
case around the role of the state in markets 
and the UK’s position in an international eco-
nomic order: for instance, raising expenditure 
on R&D in relation to the OECD average, or 
the development of strategic technologies for 
economic and international advantage (such as 
space technology).
References to the corporate and institutional 
rationales are largely through the use of case 
study examples of positive practices. The lack 
of reference to any measures to change cur-
rent structures and practices suggests that the 
government perceives little that is wrong with 
these, despite extensive evidence to the con-
trary (see Jacobs et  al., 2017 for a summary). 
This is reflected in the findings of the BEIS 
Parliamentary Select Committee (Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, 
2017). This is quite a striking inference by the 
government given the nature of the UK’s prod-
uctivity problem and laggard firms (Haldane, 
2017), the reliance on financial services and 
markets located overwhelmingly in London, 
and the wider economic role of the Greater 
South East in the national economy (Hildreth 
and Bailey, 2014).
Apart from a desire to “maximise the advan-
tages of the global shift to clean growth” (HM 
Government, 2017b, 14), the social and envir-
onmental arguments are generally absent from 
the industrial strategy documents. These ap-
pear to be of little concern for central govern-
ment, with investment in battery development 
and new materials more a matter of securing 
competitive advantage. However, it is notice-
able that many local bodies (LEPs and local 
authorities) have sought to explore how their 
local industrial strategies might be able to sup-
port inclusive growth and to recognise the sig-
nificance of new environmental technologies 
and markets (Lee, 2019).
Finally, this leaves the spatial aspect of the 
industrial strategy. Although reference is made 
to place and to the need for rebalancing, as 
Bailey et  al. (2018) find, there is little regard 
for the need to address issues around capability 
and institutional capacity at any systemic 
level. Moreover, the proposed mechanisms for 
implementing the industrial strategy remain 
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largely through competitive funding rounds 
with little attention paid to local capabilities 
and institutional arrangements (Hildreth and 
Bailey, 2014), nor to the need for redistribution 
between regions. Our focus in the rest of this 
article is to explore these spatial limitations fur-
ther by tracing the likely spatial consequences 
of this new set of interventions for the UK.
Methodology
General approach
There is a well-established literature on the dif-
fusion of innovation at a regional, national and 
international level. While this tends to suggest 
there is a distance decay in the spread of innov-
ation benefits (Rodríguez-Pose and Crescenzi, 
2008), the pattern varies depending on a range 
of factors, including R&D investment type, re-
gional firm structure and internal-external link-
ages, and national factors (Crescenzi et al., 2007). 
Our attention is not with spill-over effects but 
rather with the likely immediate benefits of the 
first wave of the ISCF, drawing on a descriptive 
analysis of key sectors and research establish-
ments. Jacobs et al. (2017) raise concerns at the 
corporate and institutional level which suggest 
that the UK has a poorly performing innovation 
system, at least in terms of bringing broad sec-
toral and regional benefits. This is largely out-
side the scope of our approach. The justification 
of our approach is to test the previous Prime 
Minister’s statement that the benefits of the 
ICSF will reach every part of the UK.
The first tranche of the UK government’s 
ISCF was at the time of its announcement the 
largest new spending commitment arising from 
the industrial strategy. We deploy official and 
national government statistics on employment 
to assess the scale and distribution of these ISCF 
sectors in the context of UK manufacturing and 
the economy as a whole. This helps to fill a gap 
given the limited analysis in the Green and 
White Papers around the scale and significance 
of the sectors being targeted, especially in rela-
tion to other industries.
In terms of the likely regional and local im-
pacts, at the time of our analysis, it was too 
early to know exactly which companies and 
organisations will receive ISCF funding and 
hence where funded activities might be located. 
However, by looking at the location of the 
target sectors, it is possible to understand which 
places across the UK are most likely to benefit 
from the initial stages of the ISCF initiative. The 
analysis here draws on employment statistics 
at a number of geographical scales—namely, 
local authority districts, sub-regions (such as 
LEP areas in England), regions and countries. 
Finally, the location of R&D establishments is 
considered because, along with universities and 
R&D functions on production sites, these are 
in the first instance likely to be the prime bene-
ficiaries of the new government funding. This 
analysis is indicative, as it was unclear from the 
contemporary ISCF documentation whether 
the initial beneficiaries would be businesses, 
universities or research establishments.
The result of our analysis is essentially an ex 
ante assessment of the likely spatial impacts of 
first-wave ISCF spending on different parts of 
the UK. This type of analysis has been lacking 
to date but it is important if spreading the bene-
fits across the whole of the UK is to be taken 
seriously as one of the aims of the industrial 
strategy. Nevertheless, there are limitations 
to this approach, not least because one of the 
challenges in examining expenditure on innov-
ation and new technology is that the eventual 
outcomes can be difficult to pre-determine, for 
the reasons presented above. The focus of this 
approach is essentially on inputs (additional 
expenditure) rather than on exploring how ef-
fective the approach may be in different places 
in terms of innovation processes, technological 
diffusion (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988; Fagerberg, 
2018) and final outcomes.
Measuring the sectors
The first step in assessing the scale and loca-
tion of the six first-wave ISCF target sectors 
was to identify the categories under which they 
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fall in official statistics. This is not straightfor-
ward because there tends to be a time lag be-
fore new or emerging industries are given their 
own statistical categories. The match between 
the six sectors and the government’s Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) is therefore im-
perfect (Table 1).
The numbers in this list refer to categories in 
the 2007 SIC, the one currently in use and ap-
plying to the most recent employment statistics. 
Two important points should be noted about 
this match of sectors to statistics. First, it pro-
vides a broad, possibly generous, definition of 
the six target ISCF sectors. There is no separate 
statistical category for ‘self-driving vehicles’, for 
example, so the figures used include all motor 
vehicle manufacturing, although it could be ar-
gued that in the long run the whole of the motor 
industry might be impacted by driverless tech-
nology. Likewise, it is impossible to separate 
out ‘satellites and space technology’ from the 
rest of the aerospace industry, and ‘batteries for 
clean and flexible energy storage’ are mixed in 
with all other battery manufacture. Within the 
healthcare sector, the government’s initial focus 
is rather narrowly on pharmaceuticals. The ef-
fect on all the figures we present is that they 
substantially overstate the scale of the sectors 
directly targeted by the first wave of the ISCF. 
Similarly, the focus on additional public expend-
iture does not consider additional investments 
by companies in particular locations and plants.
Second, there is significant functional overlap 
between some of the statistical categories. For 
example, the category ‘research and experi-
mental development on natural sciences and 
engineering’ includes many of the labs where 
new materials for the aerospace and motor 
industries might be developed. This sort of 
overlap is just the sort of technological conver-
gence which needs to be supported. Likewise, 
‘batteries for clean and flexible energy storage’ 
are something that might well be fitted in ‘self-
driving vehicles’. This suggests that it makes 
most sense to focus on the scale and location of 
the six sectors as a whole rather than on indi-
vidual component parts. These issues are ones 
which need to be addressed by further research 
at a fine-grained local level and through robust 
ex post evaluation of the impacts of the ICSF.
Spatial analysis
National scale of the sectors
Table 2 shows the number of employees in the 
industries that match up to the sectors targeted 
by the first wave of the ISCF. The figures here 
and in all subsequent tables and maps are taken 
from the government’s Business Register and 
Employment Survey (BRES), which provides 
the most detailed and reliable breakdown of 
employment by industry and location. The fig-
ures in Table 2 are for Great Britain as a whole in 
2017, the most recent year for which BRES data 
were available at the time of writing. Industry 
by industry, R&D on natural sciences and en-
gineering accounts for the largest number of 
Table 1. ICSF first-wave sectors mapped to SICs.
Healthcare and medicine
 21100 Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
 21200 Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations
  26600 Manufacture of irradiation, electromechanical 
and electrotherapeutic equipment
  32500 Manufacture of medical and dental instruments 
and supplies
  72110 Research and experimental development on bio-
technology
Robotics and artificial intelligence
  28990 Manufacture of other special-purpose machinery 
n. e. c.
Batteries for clean and flexible energy storage
 27200 Manufacture of batteries and accumulators
Self-driving vehicles
  29100 Manufacture of motor vehicles
Manufacturing and materials of the future
  23990 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral prod-
ucts n. e. c.
  72190 Research and experimental development on nat-
ural sciences and engineering
Satellites and space technology
  30300 Manufacture of air and spacecraft and related 
machinery
 51220 Space transport
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jobs (118,000). These are jobs in free-standing 
research centres rather than university labora-
tories, which are counted with the rest of the 
higher education sector. By way of contrast, at 
the present time, there are no recorded jobs in 
Great Britain in space transport.
The more significant figures are in the lower 
part of the Table, which shows that these indus-
tries together account for just over 380,000 jobs, 
which is only 1.3% of all GB employment. The 
jobs just in manufacturing (that is, excluding 
R&D laboratories, which official statistics class 
as part of the service sector) are fewer still, at 
just under 260,000, though they account for at 
just over 10% of all manufacturing jobs. These 
headline numbers are important because they 
underline the extent to which the initial focus 
of the ISCF is narrowly targeted even in terms 
of manufacturing industry. Looking at the same 
figures from the opposite direction, they mean 
that 99% of the economy (by employment) 
and 90% of manufacturing looks likely to be 
bypassed as direct beneficiaries of the new 
funding.
It could be argued that through supply chain 
linkages and spill-over effects, the ISCF first-
wave target sectors are likely to have a wider 
impact on the economy, for example through 
a number of innovation diffusion mechanisms. 
This is a reasonable expectation, although its 
detailed geography could only be uncovered by 
means of analysis based on corporate supply 
chain and related data. It also needs to be re-
membered that the sectors the government is 
targeting are much more tightly defined than 
the statistical categories used here. It is not the 
whole of motor vehicle manufacturing that 
would qualify for support, for example, but only 
driverless vehicles, so these wider effects may be 
relatively restricted. Similarly, the extent of direct 
job creation in these activities is rather opaque, 
and hence the downstream effects are as well. 
That said, there is evidence that the emergence 
of new posts in high-tech and digital sectors 
stimulates lower skilled job creation in the local 
service sector (see, for example, Lee and Clarke, 
2019), albeit at the expense of average wages and 
overall purchasing power for such workers.
Geographical location of the target 
sectors
A central part of our analysis was the geo-
graphical distribution of employment in the six 
target sectors across Great Britain. Figures 1 
and 2 show the total number of jobs in these 
sectors for each local authority district for 
England and Wales and Scotland, respectively. 
These reveal a markedly uneven distribution 
across the three nations, but also a complex pat-
tern. The biggest single concentration of jobs 
in these sectors is in and around Cambridge, 
an area which has traditionally not been the 
centre of UK manufacturing although it is cer-
tainly a major centre for R&D. Cambridge it-
self has 4900 jobs in the six sectors but South 
Cambridgeshire, which wholly surrounds the 
city, has a further 14,300—the highest total of 
any district in Great Britain—bringing the local 
total to 19,200.
Table 2. Employment in ISCF first-wave target sectors, GB, 2017.
 Employees
Basic pharmaceutical products 7000
Pharmaceutical preparations 32,000
Irradiation, electromechanical and  
electrotherapeutic equipment
5000
Medical and dental instruments and supplies 36,000
Research and experimental development  
on biotechnology
9000
Other special purpose equipment n. e. c. 10,000
Batteries and accumulators 2000
Motor vehicle manufacturing 79,000
Other non-metallic mineral products n. e. c. 6000
R&D on natural sciences and engineering 118,000
Air and spacecraft and related technology 82,000
Space transport 0
Total 386,000
as % of all GB employees 1.3
of which Manufacturing 259,000
as % of GB manufacturing employees 10.8
Source: BRES.
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Figure 1. Employment in ISCF first-wave target sectors, by local authority district, England and Wales, 2017.
Source: BRES.
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Figure 2. Employment in ISCF first-wave target sectors, by local authority, Scotland, 2017.
Source: BRES.
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Most of the other large concentrations of 
jobs tend to be associated with a single large 
manufacturing plant in the motor or aero-
space industries. Examples include Nissan 
in Sunderland, BAE Systems in Lancashire, 
Airbus in Flintshire in North Wales, JLR on 
Merseyside, Rolls Royce in Derby, a cluster of 
car plants in and around Birmingham, Airbus 
(again) near Bristol, further car assembly 
plants in Oxford and Swindon, engine plants 
in Dagenham and Bridgend, and Westland 
helicopters in Somerset. Although the 
government’s intention is to use the new Fund 
to support the motor and aerospace industries 
as a whole, the new money that is relevant to 
these industries is actually being targeted, as 
we noted, at a very narrow range of technolo-
gies—driverless cars, batteries, new materials, 
robotics and spacecraft. So in practice, not 
all these car and aerospace plants can be ex-
pected to benefit from the work supported by 
the Fund, certainly not directly or immediately, 
and perhaps not even in the long run.
At the other end of the spectrum, what is 
striking is that a large number of local authority 
districts have barely any jobs in the target sec-
tors: 58 districts across Britain have fewer than 
100 jobs in the six targeted sectors; and 149 of 
the 380 districts across Britain have fewer than 
300 jobs in the six targeted sectors. A number 
of large cities and towns have quite modest 
numbers too, including Bradford (950 jobs), 
Leicester (1,250), Middlesbrough (200), Hull 
(1,200), Nottingham (1,550), Stoke-on-Trent 
(400) and Swansea (450).
However, the local authority district scale 
may not be the most appropriate for assessing 
likely impacts. Because of commuting flows, 
local labour markets mostly function at a sub-
regional scale. In labour market terms, there-
fore, it may not matter if a local authority 
district has few if any jobs in the target sectors 
as long as there are plenty of jobs in these in-
dustries in neighbouring areas. To address this 
issue, Table 3 looks at employment in the target 
sectors by sub-region. In England, the sub-
regions here are LEP areas. The sub-regions 
are ranked by the share of all employees in the 
target sectors. The table also shows the share of 
manufacturing jobs in the target sectors.
The sub-regional distribution of the sec-
tors highlights three points. First, the share of 
all employment in sectors targeted by the first 
wave of the ICSF is nowhere very large. On 
this measure, Coventry & Warwickshire has 
the highest concentration at just over 4%. In 
the vast majority of sub-regions, the ISCF sec-
tors account for less than 2% of all jobs. This 
underlines the distinctly narrow sectoral focus. 
Second, there is nevertheless big variation be-
tween sub-regions. As a percentage of all jobs, 
Coventry & Warwickshire at the top of the 
table has 13 times as much employment in 
the ISCF sectors as Cornwall at the bottom 
of the table. Or perhaps more pertinently, 
Oxfordshire has a five times greater concentra-
tion of employment in these sectors than, for 
example, the Sheffield City Region, one of the 
country’s industrial heartlands. This underlines 
the extent to which the focus on a narrow range 
of sector favours some local economies over 
others. Third, the pattern of variation between 
sub-regions is complex, and does not reflect a 
clear North-South divide. Instead, the pattern 
across the country mostly reflects the location 
of a number of large car and aerospace plants 
and concentrations of R&D facilities. Apart 
from Oxfordshire, the sub-regions covering 
Cambridgeshire, Wiltshire and Berkshire all 
have relatively large numbers in the target sec-
tors, but so do Coventry & Warwickshire, North 
Wales, Lancashire, the Derby and Nottingham 
area, and Cheshire & Warrington.
The lower part of the Table includes a 
number of places worth highlighting. At the 
very bottom, Cornwall & the Isles of Scilly not 
only has the smallest share of employment in 
the target sectors but also has the lowest GVA 
per head of any English NUTS2 area (that is, 
statistical sub-region). It is hard to see how such 
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Table 3. Employment in ISCF first-wave target sectors, by sub-region, 2017.
 Number of jobs as % of manufacturing as % of all employees
Coventry & Warwickshire 18,200 31.4 4.0
North Wales 10,900 24.0 3.9
Oxfordshire 13,000 24.6 3.6
Greater Cambridge & Gr. Peterborough 23,600 7.4 3.0
Lancashire 18,100 18.8 2.9
Derby, Derbyshire, Nottingham & Notts 26,200 17.4 2.8
Cheshire & Warrington 13,300 24.4 2.7
Swindon & Wiltshire 8400 17.2 2.7
Thames Valley Berkshire 10,600 10.1 2.1
Hertfordshire 12,900 15.1 2.0
Liverpool City Region 12,300 19.6 2.0
North East 15,900 14.5 2.0
Gloucestershire 5500 14.0 1.9
Greater Birmingham & Solihull 18,300 18.5 1.9
Solent 9300 16.8 1.8
Cardiff City Region 10,900 13.8 1.7
West of England 10,000 25.5 1.7
Enterprise M3 11,900 16.7 1.6
Tees Valley 3700 2.8 1.4
Buckinghamshire Thames Valley 3000 13.6 1.3
York, North Yorkshire & East Riding 6700 7.1 1.3
Coast to Capital 10,000 17.3 1.2
Heart of the South West 8400 11.6 1.2
Leicester & Leicestershire 5600 3.9 1.2
East of Scotland 8000 5.9 1.1
South East Midlands 10,400 8.3 1.1
Tayside 1900 7.2 1.1
Worcestershire 3100 6.8 1.1
Highlands & Islands 1300 9.8 0.9
Humber 3400 4.8 0.9
West of Scotland 9500 10.1 0.9
New Anglia 5400 4.7 0.8
Stoke-on-Trent & Staffordshire 3500 5.1 0.8
Mid Wales 600 4.5 0.7
Sheffield City Region 5000 4.1 0.7
South East 10,500 5.4 0.7
Dorset 1900 4.2 0.6
Greater Lincolnshire 2600 3.4 0.6
Leeds City Region 8400 3.5 0.6
Greater Manchester 7000 4.0 0.5
London 25,600 8.0 0.5
Swansea City Region 1300 2.8 0.5
The Marches 1500 2.7 0.5
Black Country 2100 3.2 0.4
Cumbria 1000 1.9 0.4
North East Scotland 1400 1.2 0.4
South of Scotland 400 1.5 0.4
Cornwall & Isles of Scilly 700 1.5 0.3
Great Britain 386,000 10.8 1.3
Note: Some LEP areas overlap so the numbers here do not sum to the GB total.
Source: BRES.
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a narrowly focussed industrial strategy will do 
much to address Cornwall’s economic prob-
lems. Greater Manchester also rests near the 
foot of the table, despite being the focus of the 
government’s Northern Powerhouse initiative. 
Across the Pennines, the Leeds and Sheffield 
City Regions—two of Britain’s traditional in-
dustrial heartlands—also rank very low in 
terms of jobs in the first-wave ISCF sectors.
Finally, Table 4 summarises the data at a 
wider scale for Scotland, Wales and the English 
regions. This emphasises the point that the dis-
tribution of ISCF target sector jobs across the 
country is not a simple North-South divide, 
though the South East of England does have 
the largest absolute numbers. London actually 
has the smallest share of employment in ISCF 
sectors, while Yorkshire & the Humber and 
Scotland also lag rather far behind the rest of 
Britain.
Location of research and development 
establishments
In the short-run, the funding the government is 
channelling into R&D to support its industrial 
strategy is likely to go to universities, into R&D 
in companies and into free-standing research 
and development establishments. The wider 
sectors that are intended to be the final bene-
ficiaries, such as aerospace and motor vehicle 
manufacturing, only stand to benefit further 
down the line as new products and processes 
come onstream. It is therefore worth looking 
more closely at where these R&D establish-
ments are located. Regarding universities, 
the government notes that 46% of Research 
Council and Higher Education Funding Council 
for England (HEFCE) monies are presently 
spent in Oxford, Cambridge and London (HM 
Government, 2017a). Beyond these three loca-
tions, a number of other large, older universities 
are prominent in industrial R&D, and most 
universities are located in cities. Rural areas, 
seaside towns and the former coalfields, for ex-
ample, mostly lack universities of their own and 
are unlikely therefore to benefit from money 
flowing into R&D facilities. Regarding R&D 
attached to manufacturing sites, the places 
where ISCF sectors are already located (see 
Figures 1 and 2) are the most likely to be bene-
ficiaries. Pharmaceutical research by commer-
cial companies, for example, often takes place 
alongside pharmaceutical manufacture.
The location of free-standing R&D estab-
lishments is easier to pin down using official 
statistics. Figures 3 and 4 show the employment, 
by local authority district, in establishments 
carrying out ‘research and experimental de-
velopment on biotechnology, natural sciences 
and engineering’ (that is, SIC classes 72110 and 
Table 4. Employment in ISCF first-wave target sectors, by region and country, 2017.
 Number of jobs as % of manufacturing as % of all employees
North East 19,700 12.3 1.9
Wales 23,000 13.9 1.9
East of England 49,200 9.3 1.8
East Midlands 36,800 10.3 1.8
West Midlands 44,200 13.3 1.7
North West 51,800 13.1 1.6
South East 63,100 13.9 1.5
South West 36,300 13.8 1.5
Scotland 22,000 6.7 0.9
Yorkshire & the Humber 16,400 4.0 0.7
London 24,600 8.0 0.5
Great Britain 386,000 10.8 1.3
Source: BRES.
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Figure 3. Employment in R&D establishments, by local authority district, England and Wales, 2017.
Source: BRES.
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Figure 4. Employment in R&D establishments, by local authority, Scotland, 2017
Source: BRES.
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72190). This includes free-standing R&D units 
run by companies, trade associations, charitable 
foundations and the public sector. Many of these 
are the establishments most likely to benefit 
directly and immediately from the increase in 
government spending on R&D. To underline 
the locational concentration of R&D of this 
kind, Table 5 lists the 20 local authority districts 
across Britain with the largest number of jobs 
in these establishments. The dominance of the 
Cambridge area is striking—in total, there are 
some 15,500 jobs in and around the city. It is im-
portant to remember that this excludes R&D 
in Cambridge University itself. The Cambridge 
area alone, which has a combined population 
of just 285,000 (less than 0.5% of the GB total), 
accounts for 12% of all GB employment in 
scientific R&D establishments. Looking down 
the list of the top 20 districts for employment 
in R&D establishments, it is also noticeable 
that industrial areas in the North, Scotland and 
Wales are few in number. Manchester makes 
the list but there is no Liverpool, Newcastle, 
Sheffield or Glasgow, and Stockton on Tees is 
the only second-tier older industrial town.
The profoundly uneven geography of R&D 
is underlined by Table 6, which looks at employ-
ment by region and country. The three regions 
in the south east corner of Britain (London, 
South East and East) have a combined total 
of 73,000 jobs in R&D establishments, or well 
over half the GB total. Even within these three 
regions, the jobs are concentrated in just a few 
places, as the maps earlier demonstrated. By 
contrast, the three regions of northern England 
(North East, North West and Yorkshire and the 
Humber) can muster a combined total of just 
20,000 jobs in R&D establishments of this kind. 
With over 15,000 jobs, the Cambridge area 
alone has more jobs in R&D establishments 
than the whole of the Midlands (14,800); more 
jobs in R&D establishments than the combined 
total in Scotland and Wales (13,400); and only 
4,500 jobs fewer in R&D establishments than 
the whole of the North of England, an area with 
a total population of 15.2 million or 50 times 
greater than the Cambridge area. The location 
Table 5. Employment in R&D establishments,a top 20 dis-
tricts in Britain, 2017.
 Number of jobs
South Cambridgeshire 10,700
Cambridge 4800
Vale of White Horse 4400
Camden 2700
Westminster 2600
Wiltshire 2600
Stevenage 2400
Islington 2300
Stockton on Tees 2000
Welwyn Hatfield 2000
Cheshire East 1800
Reading 1800
Bracknell Forest 1600
Edinburgh 1600
Hammersmith & Fulham 1600
South Oxfordshire 1600
Manchester 1600
Windsor & Maidenhead 1600
Hillingdon 1500
Wokingham 1500
Great Britain (total) 127,000
Note: aResearch and experimental development on bio-
technology, natural sciences and engineering.
Source: BRES.
Table 6. Employment in R&D establishments,a by region 
and country, 2017.
 Number of jobs
East of England 28,800
South East 28,300
London 15,800
Scotland 9600
North West 9300
South West 7700
East Midlands 7200
Yorkshire & the Humber 5500
North East 5100
West Midlands 4600
Wales 3800
Great Britain 127,000
Note: aResearch and experimental development on bio-
technology, natural sciences and engineering.
Source: BRES.
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of R&D establishments is seldom considered as 
part of the profound geographic imbalances in 
the UK economy, but these data reveal it has 
a distinct pattern which given the focus of the 
ICSF may only exacerbate regional economic 
divides.
Conclusions
The focus of this article has been on the likely 
spatial implications of the first round of funding 
linked to the UK government’s industrial 
strategy. Two overarching conclusions can be 
drawn. First, the government’s sectoral focus is 
exceptionally narrow. On a very generous def-
inition that includes, for example, all of aero-
space and all of motor manufacturing, these 
sectors account for only 10% of manufacturing 
employment and little over 1% of the whole 
economy. This is an extremely narrow base on 
which to try to build a revival of British industry. 
Second, the government’s narrow sectoral focus 
in terms of first-wave ISCF support threatens to 
widen regional divides. The adoption and diffu-
sion of new technologies may spread over time 
beyond the sites of their original development, 
although at present the formal mechanisms 
through which such applications can be devel-
oped remain unclear. However, if the existing 
location of the target ISCF sectors is a guide 
to the impact on different parts of Britain, then 
this is likely to be profoundly uneven and in 
ways that may widen differences in prosperity.
The strong concentration of R&D activity 
in and around London and in the Cambridge 
area provides the clearest example of how an 
essentially prosperous part of the UK is likely 
to be a major beneficiary of the new funding. 
By way of contrast, there appear few opportun-
ities for traditional sectors such as the chem-
ical industry, steel or engineering. Of course, 
our focus is only on the first tranche of ISCF 
funding; subsequent waves have brought in 
additional ‘challenge areas’ such as food and 
drink, smart energy and creative industries, and 
the nine ‘Sector Deals’ extend the list to include 
construction, nuclear and rail transport. This 
expanded focus is likely to spread the benefits 
of ISCF expenditure more widely, although this 
would need to be demonstrated by the sort of 
fine-grained spatial analysis presented above. 
Moreover, in financial terms, this first tranche 
of ISCF funding is significant in that it involves 
over a fifth of the total allocation of £4.7 bil-
lion, and represents a much larger sum than has 
been made available to either the second or 
third waves (HM Treasury, 2018).
By implication, for many places, the ISCF ap-
pears to offer very little. Most manufacturing 
does not produce new high-technology prod-
ucts and is removed from exotic leading-edge 
technologies. However, this does not mean that 
such types of industry should not be offered 
support. What matters for these sectors is how 
technology is adopted and applied, and that 
industries’ position in international markets is 
maintained and strengthened. This often relies 
on incremental improvements in products and 
processes, in selling new products to new mar-
kets and in better management practices. That 
these businesses have survived in the face of 
globalisation is an indicator that they still have 
a role to play in a diverse economy.
The conclusion from the analysis is that the 
first, scene-setting wave of the UK’s ISCF has 
proved to be sectorally narrow and spatially 
blind, bringing with it the prospect that it will 
reinforce regional inequalities. This myopia is 
not just about uneven geographical distribu-
tions but also concerns the differences between 
places, the links between national decisions 
and local outcomes, and the potential feedback 
from successful local clusters of businesses to 
higher national output and productivity.
This analysis is set within a broader frame-
work for understanding different forms of in-
dustrial policy. This established that the UK’s 
industrial strategy is strongly guided by what 
can be seen as technological and political im-
peratives, and follows to a large extent spatially 
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blind approaches informed by new economic 
geography. Although not explicitly stated, the 
industrial strategy follows from a dominant 
model of UK political economy (Martin, 2018), 
and may reinforce the broad neo-classical ap-
proach to economic development pursued 
in the UK for at least 40 years (Hildreth and 
Bailey, 2013). Consideration of approaches 
which may seek to build regional capabilities, 
which devolve power and build local institu-
tional capacity and which more actively address 
corporate and regulatory issues, are almost 
completely absent from the industrial strategy 
(Berry, 2018; Fai, 2018; Hildreth and Bailey, 
2013; Jacobs et al., 2017), save for a few places 
in receipt of devolved powers (National Audit 
Office, 2016).
Appraisal of industrial policy has tended to 
focus on the debate between spatially blind 
and place-based policies (Bailey et  al., 2018). 
Our evidence brings more clarity and detail 
to these two sides of the debate. However, we 
would argue that the place-based debate (fol-
lowing Barca (2009) and taken on by Hildreth 
and Bailey (2013)) does not go far enough. An 
example would be the limited attention given 
to the profound regional implications of aus-
terity for the poorest parts of the UK (Beatty 
and Fothergill, 2017). Calls for fiscal and polit-
ical devolution of powers (Jacobs et al., 2017) 
alone are unlikely to shift entrenched regional 
inequality. A new national agenda of change to 
structures of political economy, backed by fiscal 
transfer and new bolder models of local and re-
gional democracy, are required.
This article is an initial attempt to appraise a 
significant new stream of government funding, 
but also an essay in positioning this stream of 
funding within wider debates around regional 
policy. Further analysis might introduce some 
of the intervening variables between new fi-
nancial inputs and outcomes, such as skills, 
institutional capacity and absorptive capacity. 
What is striking in the UK’s industrial strategy 
documentation is how little acknowledgement 
is given to innovation systems, to regional 
policy and to technology diffusion and adop-
tion. However, our fundamental concern is 
that if the UK government were more intent 
on reducing regional inequalities, it would not 
have started with a spatially blind approach. 
The scale, persistence and growth of regional 
inequalities (Martin et  al., 2015) should be 
of significant concern to industrial policy 
makers. Part of the solution to this challenge 
lies with more spatially sensitive, place-based 
approaches, but more broadly with the need 
for more fundamental changes to the political 
economy of the UK and the spatial inequal-
ities it perpetuates.
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